Insights from Experimental Economics for the design of
Australian electricity, gas and environmental markets

A workshop for Australian stationary energy sector stakeholders with

Professors Vernon Smith and Stephen Rassenti

George Mason University, USA

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California’s RECLAIM Emissions Market [pdf]

Market Design and Motivated Human Trading Behavior in Electricity Markets [pdf]

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California: Energy Crisis or Market Design Crisis? [pdf].

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity markets; Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels [pdf].

Spot market mechanism design and competitivity issues in electric power [pdf].

Demand-Side Bidding Will Control Market Power and Decrease the Level and Volatility of Prices [pdf].

USING EXPERIMENTS TO INFORM THE PRIVATIZATION/DEREGULATION MOVEMENT IN ELECTRICITY [pdf].

Efficiency and Income Shares in High-Demand Energy Networks: Who Receives the Congenstion Rents When a Line is Constrained? [pdf].

Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand-side Bidding [pdf].

TURNING OFF THE LIGHTS: Consumer-allowed service interruptions could control market power and decrease prices [pdf].

Please contact Hugh Outhred for further information. Tel: 02 9385 4035; email: h.outhred@unsw.edu.au.